Abstract. The quantitative implications of a setting with household heterogeneity and incomplete financial markets have been widely studied in the literature, mostly under the assumption that households own the stock of physical capital and undertake the intertemporal investment decision, while firms simply rent capital and labor from the households to maximize profits on a period by period basis. The present paper provides the conditions under which this distinction is irrelevant even if markets are incomplete and households are subject to general portfolio restrictions. It is shown that, if the firm owns the stock of capital and it chooses the optimal investment level to maximize its market value, in the sense that it discounts future cash flows with positive state prices that are consistent with security prices, the equilibrium allocations are the same as in the standard setting with static firms, while there might still be shareholder disagreement. Further, the allocations are sensitive to the objective of the firm in the absence of value maximization, particularly with respect to aggregate behavior.
Introduction
Following Bewley (1977 Bewley ( , 1986 , an extensive literature has studied the quantitative implications of calibrated models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets. Among others, Aiyagari (1994) , Huggett (1997) , Smith (1997, 1998) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001a , 2001b , 2004 have analyzed the effects of such a framework on the aggregate savings rate, the shape of the wealth distribution, the portfolio asset returns, and the welfare costs of business cycles. While these models are characterized by the presence of an endogenous production sector using as inputs physical capital and labor, an important assumption is that households (as opposed to the firm) are the owners of the capital stock and undertake the intertemporal investment decision, while the firm simply rents capital and labor from the households to maximize profits on a period by period basis. This distinction is innocuous under complete markets, but it becomes relevant when markets are incomplete. In particular, if one assumes instead that the firm owns the stock of physical capital and decides on the optimal investment level, the usual value maximization objective is no longer well defined when markets are incomplete, since the available markets no longer provide sufficient information to value future streams of resources unambiguously. Further, the shareholders' evaluations of different investment alternatives might differ from those of the firm, and shareholder disagreement may result in equilibrium.
Given the increasing relevance of general equilibrium models with incomplete financial markets for quantitative analysis, an understanding of the implications of the ownership of physical capital is important, and the present paper contributes to this direction in several ways. First, it provides the conditions under which the irrelevance of capital ownership that prevails under complete markets still holds when markets are incomplete. In particular, it discusses different approaches proposed in the literature concerning the definition of an appropriate firm objective when markets are incomplete and it then identifies a particular firm objective under which the equilibrium allocations are the same as in the standard setting with static firms. Second, it highlights some of the potential quantitative implications of different firm objectives under which the ownership of physical capital is relevant. Given this, our findings also contribute a large strand of literature on shareholder unanimity that we discuss below, and which has been mostly developed in a static or two period framework.
The framework for our analysis is an infinite horizon economy with one good, aggregate uncertainty, idiosyncratic risk and sequential trading in a finite number of assets subject to portfolio restrictions. The general environment is first presented in the framework of what we call the exchange economy, assuming that the production or investment plan is taken as given, and we then extend it to a framework where the production plan is optimally determined. First, we assume that households own the stock of physical capital and make the inter-temporal investment decision, while the firm simply rents capital and labor from the households to maximize profits on a period by period basis. Given this, the firm can be considered as being static or short lived. Next, we assume that the firm is the owner of the physical capital stock and undertakes the inter-temporal investment decision, in which case it can be considered as being dynamic or infinitely lived. Since we allow for potentially incomplete financial markets, however, the definition of the dynamic firm objective becomes more complicated.
As stated earlier, the main problem with the objective of the firm arises due to the lack of sufficient information from the available financial markets to value future streams of resources, implying that a model with value maximizing firms must incorporate a firm valuation function that reflects its beliefs about future prices. The approach taken by authors like DeMarzo (1988 DeMarzo ( , 1993 and Duffie and Shafer (1986b) is to discount future cash flows with some present value process that is consistent with market prices, in the sense that it satisfies a present value or no arbitrage relationship between the security prices and the one period payoffs. On the other hand, recognizing that value maximization according to some consistent present value prices might lead to shareholder disagreement, a second group of authors (Dreze (1974 (Dreze ( , 1985 , DeMarzo (1993) , and Grossman and Hart (1979) ) have suggested to discount future cash flows with a weighted sum of the marginal rates of substitution of the different shareholders, with the weights reflecting the general shareholder composition. Finally, a third group of authors (Radner (1972a) , Sandmo (1972) , Sondermann (1974) or Leland (1972) ) simply have assumed the existence of a utility function for the firm, defined exogenously over state distribution of profits. In the present paper, we define a general objective function that nests these approaches as particular cases. Further, to analyze shareholder unanimity, we follow Duffie and Shafer (1986b) and define a production plan unilaterally chosen by the firm to be optimal for a shareholder if it maximizes his or her own utility.
Our main results can be informally summarized as follows. We show that, under relatively standard assumptions on preferences and technology, if the dynamic firm maximizes its market value, in the sense that it discounts its future cash flows with some consistent present value process, the equilibrium allocations with dynamic firms are the same as in the standard setting where households undertake the intertemporal investment decision and firms have a static optimization problem. In particular, using the results of Santos and Woodford (1997) , who study the existence of price bubbles in an infinite horizon pure exchange economy, we first show that bubbles can be ruled out in our production economies due to the presence of trade in a claim to productive activity. Further, in the absence of price bubbles, the investment plan chosen by a value maximizing firm can be shown to be equal to its exdividend firm value. Since this is the same investment level that households would choose if they were undertaking the inter-temporal investment decision, it is then possible to show the equivalence of the two production allocations. The results can also be extended to a more general framework that allows for external financing of the investment plan. Finally, a value maximizing production plan might still lead to shareholder disagreement, since the firm valuation of future cash flows only coincides with the valuation of the unconstrained shareholders 1 .
Our findings are further illustrated with an example where households can only trade in claims to productive activity, and which has been widely discussed in the macro-finance literature by authors like Aiyagari (1994) , Huggett (1997) and Smith (1997, 1998) . In particular, using the standard static firm setup, the authors have shown that the presence of idiosyncratic risk under imperfect risk sharing can lead to an increase in the value of the aggregate capital stock due to precautionary savings motives. Given our equivalence results, it is clear that precautionary savings will also lead to an increase in the aggregate capital stock (or the value of the firm) in the analogous dynamic firm setting with value maximizing firms. On the other hand, since the equivalence between the stock of physical capital and the value of the firm is broken in the absence of value maximization, precautionary savings are not necessarily reflected on the aggregate capital. We can therefore conclude that physical capital ownership may matter when markets are incomplete, especially with respect to aggregate behavior.
Our work is also related to the existing general equilibrium literature on incomplete markets with an infinite horizon, where authors like Hernandez and Santos (1996) , Levine (1989) , Quinzii (1994a,1994b) or Levine and Zame (1994) have established the existence of an equilibrium in pure exchange economies. Further, Duffie and Shafer (1986b) have analyzed shareholder agreement and the existence and optimality of equilibrium in a general incomplete markets framework with production. While an analysis of the existence and optimality of equilibrium in the presence of production is outside the scope of the present paper, we believe that our work does contribute to the understanding of production in infinite horizon economies with incomplete financial markets, while establishing a bridge between the general equilibrium macro-finance literature and the shareholder unanimity literature mentioned above.
The Model
The present section discusses the different model economies. The general environment is first presented in the framework of what we denote the exchange economy, assuming that the production plan or investment level is taken as given rather than something to be determined. After presenting the exchange economy, we discuss different production economies where the production plan is optimally determined depending on our assumptions with respect to the ownership of physical capital. In particular, we first make the usual assumption in the macroeconomic literature, implying that households own the stock of physical capital and make the inter-temporal investment decision, while the firm simply rents capital and labor from the households to maximize profits on a period by period basis. Given this, the firm can be considered as being static or short lived. Afterwards, we assume that the firm is the owner of the physical capital stock and that it undertakes all the inter-temporal investment decisions by solving a dynamic optimization problem. In this case, the firm can be considered as being dynamic or infinitely lived. Along the section, we mostly adopt the notation of Santos and Woodford (1997) , who study the existence of price bubbles in a pure exchange economy.
2.1. The Exchange Economy. We consider an infinite horizon economy with aggregate uncertainty, idiosyncratic income shocks and sequential trading. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2... Further, the resolution of uncertainty is represented by an information structure or event-tree N , where each node or date-state s t ∈ N , summarizing the history of the environment through and including date t, represents one of the information sets that may be reached at time t. Each date-state s t has a finite number S(s t ) of immediate successors, denoted by s t+1 |s t , and we use the notation s r |s t with r ≥ t to indicate that node s r belongs to the sub-tree with root s t . Further, with the exception of the unique root node s 0 at date t = 0, each node has a unique predecessor, denoted by s t−1 . The probability as of period 0 of date-event s t is denoted by π(s t ), with π(s 0 ) = 1, since the initial realization s 0 is given. In addition, π(s r |s t ) denotes the probability of s r given s t , with π(s t |s t ) = 1.
Technology. At each date-state s t ∈ N , there exists a spot market for a single consumption good y(s t ), which is produced using physical capital k(s t−1 ) ∈ R + and labor n(s t ) ∈ [0, 1] with the following aggregate technology:
where z is an aggregate productivity shock, and the initial stock of capital, denoted by k(s −1 ) ∈ R ++ , is given. We make the following assumptions.
(A.1) The technology shock z follows a stationary (Markov) process with state space
where M z is a finite set of integers, 0 < z < z < +∞, and the initial realization z(s 0 ) is given.
(A.2) Given z, the production function f (z, ·, ·) : R 2 + → R + is continuously differentiable on the interior of its domain, strictly increasing, strictly concave and homogeneous of degree one in its two arguments. We also assume that f (z, 0, n) = 0, f k (z, k, n) > 0 and f n (z, k, n) > 0 for all k > 0 and n > 0. Further, lim k→0 f k (z, k, 1) = ∞ and lim k→∞ f k (z, k, 1) = 0.
The previous two assumptions are standard in the macroeconomic literature. Assumption (A.1) models the technology shock as a stationary Markov chain, whose transition probability matrix is denoted by π z in what follows. It is important to note that our results only require that the shock takes a finite number of positive values from a compact set, and we could therefore relax the Markov assumption. Further, assumption (A.2) imposes standard conditions on the production process. In particular, it will ensure that the aggregate capital stock lies in a compact set, while the homogeneity assumption implies that f (z, k, n) = f k (z, k, n)k + f l (z, k, n)n via Euler's theorem. As we will see later, this last property is crucial for our results.
The aggregate capital stock depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0, 1], and we denote the total supply of goods available from production including undepreciated capital by:
Financial Markets. At each date-state s t , there exist spot markets for a finite number of L securities, whose returns are denominated in units of the consumption good. A security l ∈ L traded at s t is specified by its current price q l (s t ) and by its one period payoff
|s t is realized, where d l are the security dividend payments 2 . Along the section, we index the claim to productive activity by l = 1, and we let q(
A security traded at s t is of finite maturity if there exists a date T such that R l (s r |s t ) = 0 for all s r |s t with r ≥ T . Otherwise, the security is infinitely lived. We make the following assumptions.
(A.3) There is free disposal of securities, implying that q(
(A.4) In the exchange economy, the dividends paid by the productive claim are equal to:
Assumption (A.3) imposes free disposal of securities to guarantee nonnegative prices, and it then makes sense to require nonnegative dividend payments. Further, assumption (A.4) requires that the dividends of the productive claim in the exchange economy are equal to the residual of output net of investment and labor payments, which are given by the marginal product of labor times the total labor supply. As we will see later, this last assumption, specifying the mappings from the pre-determined production plan
to the productive dividend and labor payments in the exchange economy, will be satisfied in any production economy equilibrium.
Security markets are one period complete at prices q if the rank of the matrix defined by [R 0 (s t+1 )] s t+1 |s t , where one row corresponds to R 0 (s t+1 ) for each node s t+1 |s t , is equal to S(s t ). Further, markets are complete at q if they are one period complete at every datestate. Clearly, a necessary condition for markets to be complete is that L ≥ S(s t ) at all s t ∈ N . On the other hand, since we are particularly interested in the case where markets are incomplete, we make the following assumption, limiting the number of available assets 2 Note that we are abstracting from securities that pay bundles of other securities and from trade in different securities at different date-states, although this can be easily incorporated at the expense of additional notation. See Santos and Woodford (1997) or Hernandez and Santos (1996) . at each date-state.
No Arbitrage Pricing. The security price process q is arbitrage free at s t if there does not exist a portfolio a(s t ) ∈ R L such that R 0 (s t+1 )a(s t ) ≥ 0 for all s t+1 |s t and q 0 (s t )a(s t ) ≤ 0, with at least one strict inequality. In other words, arbitrage free prices have to be such that it is not possible to construct a portfolio with non-positive prices and nonnegative payoffs at every subsequent node. While this must be the case in equilibrium, it is well known that the presence of no arbitrage at date-state s t implies the existence of positive present value prices λ(s t ) > 0 and λ(s t+1 ) > 0 for each s t+1 |s t such that:
Given (q, d), the absence of arbitrage at each date-state s t allows us to define processes
for the entire information structure such that the previous no arbitrage equation holds, and we denote the set of such processes for the sub-tree with root s t by Q s t (q, d). To simplify notation, we also define the ratios λ s r t = λ(s r )/λ(s t ) for s r |s t . Note that, if markets are complete at s t , the present value ratios λ s t+1 t that are consistent with market prices are uniquely determined by the previous no arbitrage equations. On the other hand, if markets are incomplete, the number of linearly independent equations is not sufficient to uniquely determine the present value ratios.
The previous present value prices can be used to evaluate future streams of resources. In particular, for a nonnegative stream x = © x(s t ) ª s t ∈N with x(s t ) ∈ R + for all s t ∈ N , the present value of the subsequent stream of x at s t with respect to some λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) is defined as:
Similarly, the fundamental value of security l with respect to the present value price λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) is equal to:
If security prices are nonnegative, it is easy to show that 0
) and for all l ∈ L. To do this, we follow Santos and Woodford (1997) and rewrite the no arbitrage pricing condition above recursively to obtain that, for any T > t:
Taking the limit of the right hand side of the inequality as T goes to infinity, and using the fact that it is non decreasing sequence bounded above, the stated inequality obtains. Given this, the price bubble of security l with respect to the present value price λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) can be expressed as:
In addition, as shown by the previous authors, for any security l traded at s t , the fun-
for all s r |s t . Clearly, there unambiguously exists no bubble for security
, in which case the fundamental value of is uniquely defined for all λ ∈ Q s t (q, d).
Households. The economy is populated by a set I of infinitely lived households indexed by i ∈ I, where I is either finite or infinite and continuous 4 . Households' preferences %= (% i ) i∈I over consumption plans
satisfy the following assumption.
(A.6) For every i ∈ I, % i can be represented by the following function:
where β i ∈ (0, 1) is the individual discount factor, and the period utility function u i : R + → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable in the interior of its domain, with lim c i →0 u 0 i (c i ) = ∞ and lim c i →∞ u 0 i (c i ) = 0. Assumption (A.6) is standard in the macroeconomic literature, and it implies that households have a sufficient degree of impatience, in the sense that they are willing to give up a constant fraction of their future consumption to have one more unit of the good today. This property is assumed by several authors studying infinite horizon exchange economies with incomplete markets, such as Santos and Woodford (1997) , Hernandez and Santos (1996) , Levine and Zame (1994) or Quinzii (1994a) and (1994b) , and it will be crucial to establish the absence of price bubbles in the present setup.
Each household i ∈ I enters the markets at t = 0 with a finite initial endowment of each security, denoted by a l i (s −1 ), whose sum across households determines the net supply of the security at each date-state, which we denote by A l = P i∈I a l i (s −1 ). Along the section, we let A = (A 1 , ..., A L ) 0 . At each date-state s t ∈ N , households are also endowed with one unit of time entirely allocated to labor, which they can transform into i (s t ) efficiency labor units that will be used to produce output in exchange of wages. Given this, the labor income of household i ∈ I date-state s t is given by w i (s t ) = w(s t ) i (s t ), where w(s t ) is the fraction of output paid to one unit of labor. We make the following assumptions.
(A.9) The labor income shock i follows a stationary (Markov) process with state space
where M is a finite set of integers, 0 < < < 1, and the initial realization i (s 0 ) is given. Further, P i∈I i (s t ) is constant at all s t ∈ N . Assumption (A.7) requires a nonnegative initial endowment of securities for every household, and it guarantees that the supply of all securities is nonnegative. Further, assumption (A.8) requires that infinitely lived securities are in positive supply, while the supply of the productive claim A 1 is normalized to one without loss of generality. As we will see later, the nonnegative supply of infinitely lived securities is necessary to rule out price bubbles in the present setup. Finally, assumption (A.9) models the labor income shock as a discrete state Markov chain, whose transition probability matrix is denoted by π in what follows. Further, it implies that the aggregate labor supply, which is equal to the sum of individual income shocks across households, is constant, and it can therefore be normalized to one without loss of generality 5 . Here, it is important to note that our results only require that the shock takes a finite number of positive values from a compact set, and we could therefore relax the Markov assumption. Further, the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks could potentially be correlated if we let π depend on the aggregate state, as usual in the macroeconomic literature. Finally, note also that s t ∈ N represents a particular realization of the joint process of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, while their joint probability function of the two shocks will determine π(s t ) at every node.
At each date-state s t , household i ∈ I chooses consumption c i (s t ) ∈ R + and a portfolio of securities a i (s t ) ∈ R L subject to the following constraints:
The first equation represents the date-state s t budget constraint of the household, where ω i (s t ) is the individual wealth, with law of motion given by the second equation. At t = 0, the equation takes the same form with
and w i (s 0 ) ∈ R ++ due to our technological assumptions and the fact that k(s −1 ) ∈ R ++ . Finally, to avoid Ponzi schemes, the third equation imposes a finite limit of K a i (s t ) on the total amount that households can borrow at every node.
Concerning the aggregate portfolio restriction, it is important to note that our results also hold in the presence of finite constraints on the individual asset holdings of the form
for all l ∈ L and i ∈ I. In addition, the constraints can be assumed to be independent of the characteristics of the economy, as usual in the literature, or they can be endogenously determined at the level where households will never default on the trading contracts if they have the option to do so, as in Abraham and CarcelesPoveda (2004) . In these cases, however, they will be usually hit in equilibrium, further restricting the ability of households to insure against risks apart from the already imposed limits on the number of available assets. To avoid this, it is also possible to impose a particular constraint on the total portfolio value, with the property that it is never binding at any finite date, while it is the tightest borrowing limit such that the portfolio holdings satisfy the budget constraint with c i (s t ) ∈ R + for all s t ∈ N , and wealth is always nonnegative after a finite date T . This constraint, extensively discussed in the literature under complete markets, has been extended to a general incomplete markets context by Santos and Woodford (1997) , and it can be formally specified as q 0 (s t )a i (s t ) ≥ K a i (s t ) ≡ −K w i (s t ), where 6 :
In essence, the restriction implies that, in order to be able to repay their debts, households can borrow at most the lowest present value of their individual endowments.
Aggregate Feasibility. Given the non-negativity assumption on the productive dividend process, a feasible production plan has to satisfy the following restriction at every node:
where we have used the definition of the productive dividend payments in (A.4). In addition, the aggregate production and consumption plans (c,
have to satisfy the aggregate feasibility constraint:
where we have again substituted for the productive dividend process. As stated by the following lemma, the previous restrictions, together with our technological assumptions, imply that the feasible pairs (c, k) lie in a compact set, since there exists a maximum sustainable capital stock.
Lemma 2.1 If the pair (c(s t ), k(s t )) is feasible, then there exists a finite k and c such that 0 ≤ k(s t ) ≤ k and 0 ≤ c(s t ) ≤ c.
General Equilibrium. Let an exchange economy be specified by a vector of pref-
, borrowing limits
, and a feasible production plan k, which determines the sequence of productive dividends and the individual labor payments
and k (ii) all markets clear, i.e., for or all s t ∈ N , P i∈I a l i (s t ) = A l and
The existence of equilibrium for a pure exchange economy, where the individual labor endowments w i and the productive dividend payments d 1 are exogenously given, has been established by Hernandez and Santos (1996) . While the two variables in our setting are defined by the mappings from the production plan k to the labor endowments w i (k) and the productive dividend payments d 1 (k) in assumption (A.4), if the pre-determined production plan k is feasible and bounded away from zero, our assumptions (A.1)-(A.9) ensure that the assumptions imposed by the previous authors are satisfied, and the existence of an equilibrium for our exchange economy directly follows from their results.
The Production Economies.
In the present section, we present two different economies with the same characteristics as above but assuming that the production plan is optimally determined depending on the ownership of the physical capital stock. In the first economy, denoted by k-economy, we make the usual assumption in the macroeconomic literature, implying that households are the owners of the physical capital stock and make the inter-temporal investment decision, while the firm rents capital and labor from the households to maximize profits on a period by period basis. In the second economy, denoted by e-economy, the firm owns the entire stock of capital and undertakes the inter-temporal investment decision by solving a dynamic optimization problem 7 .
The k-Economy. In the k-economy, the problem of the firm is particularly simple. At each date-state s t , after observing the realization of the productivity shock z, the firm chooses capital and labor to maximize the period profits. Thus, it solves a sequence of static or one-period problems to maximize:
where w(s t ) ∈ R + and R k (s t ) ∈ R + are the competitively determined wage and gross capital rental rate respectively. As we see, the equilibrium aggregate wage rate in the k-economy is equal to the share of output allocated to labor payments in the exchange economy, but this is now a consequence of optimality for the firm. Moreover, the fact that the aggregate labor demand is equal to n(s t ) = P i∈I i (s t ) = 1 will also be a consequence of labor market clearing in equilibrium. In what follows, we let (w,
. In the k-economy, each household i ∈ I maximizes the preferences specified by % i subject to the following constraints:
The first equation represents the budget constraint of the household and the last equation imposes a portfolio constraint to avoid Ponzi schemes. Here, k i (s t ) is the amount of physical capital hold by household i at the end of period t, and its total supply is equal to the aggregate capital stock k(s t ), illustrating the fact that households make the inter-temporal investment decision in this economy. If we denote by k i (s −1 ) and a i (s −1 ) the initial asset holdings of household i ∈ I at period t = 0, the period zero budget constraint takes the same form with
. Let a k-economy be specified by a set of preferences %, transition matrices for the shocks (π z , π ), security processes (q a , d a ) and borrowing limits K a . Further, assume that the initial values are given by
. Before discussing the framework with dynamic firms, it is important to note that the household sector in the k-economy can be directly mapped into the framework of the previous exchange economy if we define the shares of physical capital hold by household i ∈ I at date-state s t by a 1 i (s t ) = k i (s t )/k(s t ). With this normalization, the total supply of shares is positive and equal to A 1 = 1. Further, if we define
, the constraints faced by the households can be rewritten as in the previous exchange economy. Note that the last equality, which follows from our technological assumptions, implies that the productive dividend payments satisfy assumption (A.4).
The e-Economy. In the e-economy, the firm owns the entire stock of physical capital. Further, the first asset represents a perfectly divisible equity share traded at price q 1 ¡ s t ¢ , and yielding a one period payoff of R 1 (s t+1 ) = q 1 (s t+1 ) + d 1 (s t+1 ) if date-state s t+1 |s t is realized. At each node s t , the firm uses capital and labor to produce output, pays wages to the total labor employed, decides on the amount of investment, which is entirely financed with retained earnings 8 , and the residual of gross profits (output net of labor payments) and investment is paid out as dividends to the firm equity owners, i.e., dimize their share value, is not well specified under market incompleteness, in the sense that the available markets do not provide sufficient information to value future dividend streams unambiguously. To see this, consider the case of effective complete markets. Note that, in a sequential trading environment, the complete markets allocation can be achieved by trading in a complete set of zero net supply state contingent claims to one period ahead consumption 9 . In particular, let m s t+1 t be the period t price of one unit of date t + 1 consumption, contingent on the economy being at date-state s t+1 |s t . Similarly, let m s t+n t be the t+n-period ahead pricing kernel, representing the period t price of one unit of time t + n consumption, contingent on the economy being at date-state s t+n |s t . Since all the shareholders will agree on the pricing kernel under complete markets, the objective of the firm at date-state s t can be naturally specified as follows:
where
As we see, if markets are complete, the firm maximizes the present discounted value of its net cash flows, using as a discount factor the unique present value process of its shareholders, which is the only element of the set Q s t (q, d). Note also that both the agents and the firm value future output in each state identically, and this implies that all shareholders will therefore agree with the production choice made by the firm. On the other hand, since a unique present value process that is consistent with market prices is not necessarily available under market incompleteness, the previous objective is no longer well defined in this case, and shareholder disagreement may result in equilibrium.
In what follows, we briefly discuss some of the approaches that have been proposed in the literature on shareholder aggreement following the seminal paper of Diamond (1967) . Since the existing unanimity results have been mostly derived in a static framework with no portfolio restrictions and under assumptions that are not imposed here, they cannot be directly extrapolated to the present framework, and a brief discussion of unanimity in the present setup will also be provided later 10 .
Value Maximization. As noted by DeMarzo (1993), a natural generalization of the Arrow Debreu firm objective to an incomplete markets setup is to require firms to maximize the value of their output according to some consistent present value prices, in the sense that they satisfy the no arbitrage condition in (3). In particular, the two period value maximizing 9 See Sargent and Ljungqvist (2000) for details of this decentralization. In addition, Huang and Werner (2001) show that the Arrow Debreu complete markets allocation can also be achieved by trading in a sufficiently high number of infinitely lived securities in positive supply if the total portfolio value is bounded from below.
10 See Stiglitz (1977, 1980) for an excellent survey on the existing unanimity results. Further, see Duffie and Shafer (1986) for a discussion of unanimity in a general multiperiod setup and Cohen-Pireni (2004) for a discussion of unanimity in a two period simplified version of the present setting.
firm objective postulated by the author can be expressed in our multi-period setup as:
This approach has also been followed by DeMarzo (1988) and Duffie and Shafer (1986b) , who study the validity of the Modigliani Miller theorem and the existence of equilibrium and shareholder agreement in a general incomplete markets context. As noted by the authors, one could alternatively assume that the firm maximizes its share price according to some beliefs or conjectured valuation function that assigns a price process to a given stream of cash flows. As long as these beliefs do not predict security prices that allow for arbitrage opportunities, there exist some positive present value prices λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) such that the valuation conjectured by the firm is equal to v N f (λ, s t ), which is the objective function above. In other words, in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the firm valuation function can be directly associated with a set of positive state price processes λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), and the previous assumption concerning the value maximizing firm objective is therefore without loss of generality.
The value maximizing optimization problem can be characterized by the following necessary and sufficient first order conditions:
The first equation determines the equilibrium aggregate wage rate, and it reflects the fact that it is now equal to the marginal product of labor as a consequence of optimality. Further, the equation implies that the productive dividend payments satisfy assumption (A.4). On the other hand, the second equation determines the optimal production plan, and it illustrates the fact that the inter-temporal investment decision in this economy is made by the firm.
Let the e-economy be specified by a set of preferences %, transition matrices for the shock processes (π z , π ), security processes d a and borrowing limits K a . Further, let the initial values be given by
, and a value maximizing equilibrium can be defined as follows.
for each i ∈ I and for each s t ∈ N , (c i , a i ) is optimal under the preferences % given (q, w), (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a and K a (ii) (w, k) satisfies the firm's optimality conditions for some λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) (iii) all markets clear, i.e., for all s t ∈ N , n(s t ) = P i∈I i (s t ) = 1,
Here, it is important to note that the set of allowable present value processes Q s t (q, d) that the firm can use to discount its net cash flows has to satisfy a fixed point problem in the following sense. When the firm discounts profits with some λ that it takes as given and that belongs to the set of admissible present value prices Q s t (q, d), the production choice k(λ) generates a new asset structure (q(λ), d(λ)) and a new set of admissible present value prices Q s t (q(λ), d(λ)) to which the original λ has to belong to. Thus, if we define a mapping from the admissible set of present value prices to the set of present value prices that it generates, the equilibrium set of discount factors can be seen as a fixed point of this mapping. On the other hand, as noted by DeMarzo (1993) and Duffie and Shafer (1986b) , if the set satisfying the previous fixed point problem is not single valued, the presence of incomplete financial markets might generate indeterminacy of equilibria with respect to the firm discount factor. In addition, since the state process λ can be interpreted as the discount factor used by the firm to value future net cash flows, value maximization will generate shareholder disagreement if λ does not agree with the valuation of the firm owners. This will be further discussed later on.
Alternative Firm Objective Criteria. Recognizing that value maximization according to some consistent present value prices might generate shareholder disagreement, a group of authors have proposed other criteria concerning the discount factor of the firm. In particular, in a two period context, Dreze (1974) has suggested to use as a discount factor a weighted average of the marginal rates of substitution of the different shareholders, with the weights reflecting the final shareholdings, while Grossman and Hart (1979) have extended this idea to a multi-period setting, arguing that the weights should correspond to the initial shareholder composition of each firm. In addition, Dreze (1985) and DeMarzo (1993) have attempted to introduce a control mechanism to decide among alternative production plans, implying that the firm should discount profits with some weighted average of the marginal rate of substitution of the controllers of the firm. In essence, all these criteria imply that the discount factor for the firm at s t+n |s t will be given by:
In what follows, we denote this objective by weighted value maximization. Note that, if the shareholders with a positive weight µ i are unconstrained in all the assets that are part of the capital structure of the firm, the process λ belongs by convexity to the consistent set of present value prices Q s t (q, d), and the previous objective is therefore be equivalent to value maximization. This situation would arise, for example, if households were subject to the present value portfolio constraint specified earlier. On the other hand, we might have situations where this is not the case. As an example, related to the setup with external finance that we will present in a subsequent section, one could think of an economy where the firm can finance its investment by issuing new equity and debt, and consider a control mechanism where the control group is composed by the shareholders with a certain percentage of the total amount of outstanding shares. If the optimal strategy of some of the shareholders in the control group is to invest in equity shares and go short in the bonds, eventually reaching their borrowing limits on debt, the previous objective will no longer lead to the same allocation as the value maximizing objective postulated earlier.
The weighted value maximization objective implicitly assumes that there exists a firm manager who is able to deduce or make the shareholders reveal information about their marginal rates of substitution, which he will have to aggregate into a single index. Recognizing that consultation of the shareholders may be time consuming and costly, a second group of authors simply have assumed the existence of a utility function for the firm, defined exogenously over state distribution of profits. Important contributions here are due to Radner (1972) , Sandmo (1972) , Sondermann (1974) , and Leland (1972) among others, and the utility maximizing firm objective can be written as:
where the period utility function of the firm u f is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, while λ is some fixed discount factor. Note that the previous decision criteria can be nested by the following general objective function:
In particular, value maximization assumes that u f (N f ) = N f and λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), weighted value maximization assumes that u f (N f ) = N f , while λ is given by the weighted average of the shareholders' present value factors. Finally, utility maximization assumes that λ is fixed and u f is concave. The first order necessary and sufficient conditions of the previous problem imply that the wage and aggregate capital will be determined by the following equations:
Further, the next definition extends the e-economy equilibrium concept to the general class of firm objectives defined above and including value maximization.
Definition 2.4. The vector of processes ((c i , a i ) i∈I , (q, w), k) is a competitive equilibrium for E e = (%, (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a , K a ) if (i) for each i ∈ I and for each s t ∈ N , (c i , a i ) is optimal under the preferences % given (q, w), (k 0 , a 0 ), (z, ), d a and K a (ii) (w, k) satisfy the optimality conditions of the firm under the objective U f (N f ) (iii) all markets clear, i.e., for all s t ∈ N , l(s t ) = P i∈I i (s t ) = 1,
Shareholder Agreement. In the present setup, we follow Duffie and Shafer (1986b) to analyze shareholder agreement and assume that a shareholder takes prices as given and agrees on the production choice unilaterally chosen by the firm if it maximizes his or her own utility. Formally, we let U i (c i ) be defined as follows:
Further, we define a feasible production plan k to be optimal for shareholder i ∈ I if it solves the problem: max
Given this, a production plan will unanimously be approved by all the shareholders if it solves
= 0 for all i ∈ I, which is the necessary and sufficient condition for unanimity in the present setup.
Equivalence of the Production Allocations
In the present section, we show that, if the firm in the e-economy maximizes its market value, in the sense that it discounts its cash flows with a present value process that satisfies the no arbitrage pricing equation in (3), an e-economy competitive equilibrium is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium in the k-economy and viceversa. To do this, we first use the results of Santos and Woodford (1997) , who study the existence of price bubbles in an infinite horizon pure exchange economy, to show that price bubbles can be ruled out in our production economies due to the presence of a claim to productive activity. Using these results, we then show that, under value maximization, the aggregate capital stock in the e-economy is equal to the ex-dividend firm value. Finally, if the two economies are characterized by the same preferences, initial values, shock processes, production plans, asset structure, and portfolio constraints, a value maximizing production plan leads to the same set of budget feasible allocations, and it is then easy to show the equivalence of the two equilibrium allocations. On the other hand, it still leads to shareholder disagreement in the presence of binding portfolio restrictions, since it will only be approved by the unconstrained shareholders of the firm.
We start by stating some of the results that we will use to prove the equivalence of the set of equilibria. Along the section, we assume that the production economies satisfy the assumptions in section two and we relegate most of the proofs to the appendix.
Proposition 3.1 Consider a competitive equilibrium for E k or E e . For each node s t ∈ N and for each security l ∈ L traded at s t , q l (
Proposition 3.1 establishes the absence of price bubbles in the present setup, and it implies that the price of a security is exactly equal to its fundamental value, which is uniquely defined, while the discounted value of the aggregate capital converges to zero as time goes to infinity 11 . To establish these results, we first show that our assumption on preferences in (A.6) imply that bubbles cannot exist for any security that is finitely lived or in positive supply and for any present value process λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) such that the present value of the aggregate wage is finite when this state price process is used. Formally, if λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) and v w (s t , λ) < +∞ for all s t ∈ N , then σ l (s r , λ) = 0 for all s r |s t and for each security l traded at s r as long as it is finitely lived or in positive supply. This part directly follows from theorem 3.3. in Santos and Woodford (1997) , extensively discussed by the authors, and we only include it for completeness. Second, we show that the presence of trade in a claim to productive activity implies that the present value of the aggregate wage is finite for any consistent present value process, i.e., v w (s t , λ) < +∞ for all λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) and all s t ∈ N . To do this, we rely on the definition of the productive dividend payments, which can be written as a fraction of total output net of investment x(s t ) = F (z(s t ), k(s t−1 ), 1) − k(s t ).
In particular, since v d 1 (s t , λ) < +∞ for every λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) and d 1 (s t ) ≥ φ[x(s t )] for some φ ∈ (0, 1), it must be the case that v x (s t , λ) < +∞ for every λ ∈ Q s t (q, d). Further, since d 1 (s t )+w(s t ) = x(s t ), it directly follows that v w (s t , λ) < +∞ for every λ ∈ Q s t (q, d). Clearly, the previous two results imply that bubbles cannot exist for any asset that is finitely lived or in positive supply. Further, since our assumption (A.8) requires that all infinitely lived assets are in positive supply, bubbles cannot exist in the present setup.
Note that the result that bubbles cannot exist for finitely lived or positive net supply securities in the presence of a productive claim has already been pointed out by Santos and Woodford (1997) , who establish the absence of price bubbles if the aggregate endowment is bounded by a portfolio plan, in the sense that d(s t )a ≥ w(s t ) for some portfolio a ≥ 0 chosen at date-state s 0 . While the authors analyze a pure exchange economy, they point out that a similar condition would be satisfied if households could trade in a claim to productive activity. Further, if this is the case, one can use the definition of v w (s t , λ) = sup λ∈Q s t (q,d) v w (s t , λ), which is formally derived by the authors, to show that v w (s t , λ) < +∞ for every λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) and any s t ∈ N . In contrast to this, we do not use the definition of v w (s t , λ) but simply rely on the definition of the productive dividend payments to prove the result.
The next lemma shows that, under value maximization, the absence of price bubbles implies that the equilibrium aggregate capital stock in the e-economy is equal to the exdividend firm value at the end of period t, denoted by V + (s t ), and given by the value of the firm's underlying assets at the end of the period.
Lemma 3.1 If the firm in the e-economy discounts its net cash flows with a consistent present value process λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), the equilibrium production plan satisfies k(s t ) = V + (s t ) for all s t ∈ N . In particular, both variables are equal to the present value of the firm's net cash flows with respect to λ, i.e.,
To prove the lemma, recall that the first order conditions of the firm's problem imply that:
where λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), and we have substituted for the labor market clearing condition n(s t ) = 1. Multiplying the previous expression with k(s t ), adding and substracting k(s t+1 ) on the right hand side, and using the homogeneity condition of the production function, which implies that
, we obtain:
Further, substituting iteratively for k(s t+n ) for 1 ≤ n ≤ T , we have that:
The first term on the right hand side of the previous equation has a well defined limit, and the second term converges to zero as T goes to infinity by proposition 3.1. Thus, taking limits of the previous equation as T goes to infinity, the aggregate capital stock can be expressed as:
On the other hand, the ex-dividend firm value V + (s t ) at the end of period t is equal to the value of equity q 1 (s t ), whose dividends are given by d 1 (s t ) = N f (s t ) at all s t ∈ N . Further, since equity is in positive supply, proposition 3.1 implies that q 1 (s t ) = v N f (s t , λ) for all λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), establishing the result¥.
The result of the previous lemma is crucial to establish the equivalence of the equilibrium allocations in the two production economies. In particular, as shown by lemma 3.2 below, it will imply that the set of budget feasible allocations is the same across the two economies as long as they are characterized by the same preferences, shock processes, initial values, asset structure, portfolio constraints and production plans. On the other hand, it is also important to note that this equivalence only holds if the production function is homogeneous of degree one in the two inputs and the firm discounts its net cash flows with a consistent present value process λ ∈ Q s t (q, d). Otherwise, the capital stock chosen by the e-economy firm will differ from its ex-dividend firm value, and the equilibrium allocations will therefore differ in the two production economies.
Lemma 3.2 Consider optimal allocations in the k-and e-economies and assume that
, q a and k are the same. If the firm in the e-economy discounts its net cash flows with a consistent present value price λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), the set of budget feasible allocations is the same in the two economies.
Lemma 3.2 shows that households in the k-economy can achieve the same consumption allocation as in the e-economy (and viceversa) by choosing the same portfolio of assets
and a physical capital investment k i that is equal to the total equity investment in the eeconomy q 1 a 1 . If the production plan k is the same in the two economies, this choice will lead to the same asset wealth, and it follows that a consumption plan that is feasible in one economy is also feasible in the other. As before, the result relies on the homogeneity of the production function and on the fact that k(s t ) = q 1 (s t ). We are now ready to state our main results. To distinguish the variables in the two production economies, the caret bearing variables always denote k-economy allocations.
Theorem 3.1 Let ((c i , a i ) i∈I , (q, w), k) be a value maximizing competitive equilibrium for E e = (%,
is a competitive equilibrium for the economy specified by
Theorem 3.1 asserts that a value maximizing equilibrium in the e-economy is an equilibrium in a k-economy with the same characteristics when the k-economy investment in physical capital is equal to the e-economy investment in equity shares, implying that the gross return on the two asset investments will also be identical. The argument of the proof is very simple. We first note that b k(s t ) = q 1 (s t ) = k(s t ), i.e., the aggregate capital stock in the k-economy is equal to the value of equity the e-economy, which is in turn equal to the e-economy capital stock by lemma 3.1. Given this, the returns on capital and labor in the k-economy, given by b R k (s t ) = R 1 (s t )/q 1 (s t−1 ) and b w(s t ) = f l (z(s t ), k(s t−1 ), 1), satisfy the k-economy firm's optimality conditions. Second, using lemma 3.2, it also follows that an optimal household allocation in the e-economy is optimal in the k-economy. Finally, market clearing in the latter economy follows from market clearing in the first. Theorem 3.2 below states that the converse is also true.
Then, there exist processes for a 1 i , and q 1 such that
for all s t ∈ N . Theorem 3.2 can be proved using similar arguments. In particular, the fact that q 1 (s t ) = b k(s t ) = b q 1 (s t ) implies that both economies have the same asset structure and the same set of consistent present value prices. Given this, the k-economy wage rate and the aggregate capital stock, which satisfies a no arbitrage pricing condition, satisfy the firm's optimality conditions in the e-economy for some λ ∈ Q s t (q, d). Using again lemma 3.2, it follows that an optimal household allocation in the k-economy is also optimal in the e-economy, and market clearing in the latter economy directly follows from market clearing in the first.
The previous theorems show that capital ownership is irrelevant under value maximization, extending the irrelevance result that holds under complete markets to a context where markets are incomplete and households are subject to general portfolio restrictions. Several remarks are worth noting. First, the theorems require an homogeneous of degree one production function and preferences that exhibit a sufficient degree of impatience. On the other hand, since these are relatively standard in the macro-finance literature, the result can be applied to a relatively general framework. Second, in spite of the fact that a value maximizing firm chooses the same production plan as if households were making the intertemporal investment decision, this does not necessarily imply that the plan is unanimously approved by all the shareholders of the firm. As stated earlier, a plan will only be unanimously approved by all the shareholders of the firm if it solves the maximization problem in (22) for all i ∈ I. In the present setting, however, it can be shown that a production plan that satisfies k(s t ) = q 1 (s t ) at all s t ∈ N only satisfies ∂U i (c i ) ∂k = 0 for all i ∈ I 1 , where I 1 ⊆ I denotes the subset of shareholders that are unconstrained in the equity market at all nodes 12 . In addition, as further discussed in the next section, the lack of unanimity under value maximization can alternatively be shown by noticing that the value maximizing discount factor λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) only agrees with the valuation of the unconstrained shareholders, whose marginal rate of substitution belongs to the consistent set Q s t (q, d).
Finally, while the previous theorems imply that value maximization leads to the same dimension of the set of equilibria in the two production economies, we have seen earlier that the equilibrium in the e-economy might depend from the particular firm discount factor λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), possibly leading to indeterminacy of equilibria (see Duffie and Shafer (1986b) ).
On the other hand, since different production choices of the dynamic firm, generating different asset structures and different sets of consistent present value prices, can also be supported by the intertemporal decisions of the households in the k-economy as different equilibria, the same indeterminacy may arise in the k-economy. As stated by the following theorem, however, if the static firm economy equilibrium exists and is unique, the equilibrium under dynamic firms is independent from the discount factor chosen. The proof of the theorem follows from the previous two. Theorem 3.3 If an equilibrium in the k-economy exists and is unique, the e-economy equilibrium exists and is invariant with respect to the firm discount factor λ ∈ Q s t (q, d).
Since the previous results can only be established in the presence of value maximization, the equilibrium allocations will differ in the two production economies when the firm has a different objective. In what follows, we consider an example that illustrates this and relates our results to the existing literature.
An Example
The present section discusses some of the previous results in the framework of a one asset economy, which has been used by several authors to study the quantitative implications of the presence of idiosyncratic risk when markets are incomplete. While the simplified model version will help to clarify some of the earlier findings, it will also be useful to relate them to the existing literature with incomplete markets and endogenous production, where authors like Aiyagari (1994) , Huggett (1997) , or Smith (1997, 1998) have studied a k-economy setting with trade in physical capital, and Carceles-Poveda (2003, 2004) has studied an e-economy setting with different objectives for the firm. Further, since the previous authors assume positive initial asset holdings, fixed portfolio restrictions, Markovian technology and labor income shocks, a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale production function, and a constant relative risk aversion utility function, their framework satisfies the assumptions of section two.
We start by analyzing the determination of the optimal investment plan in the two production economies, since this will provide some intuition about the previous equivalence results. To do this, we first consider a k-economy with trade in physical capital and a fixed portfolio restriction of K, implying that households are subject to the following constraints:
As we see, by choosing the level of physical capital investment, households make the intertemporal investment decision in this economy. In particular, if m s t+1 it denotes the datestate s t marginal rate of substitution of household i ∈ I between periods t and t + 1, his first order conditions imply that the aggregate capital stock (or the price of capital shares) has to satisfy the following equilibrium condition 13 :
where we have substituted for the equilibrium value of R k (s t ) = f k (z(s t+1 ), k(s t ), 1) + 1 − δ. As usual, the previous equation holds with equality if the portfolio constraint is not binding. Thus, if m s t+n t denotes the marginal rate of substitution between periods t and t + n of any household that is unconstrained at date-state s t+n |s t , the equation can be rewritten as follows:
(23) where we have added and substracted k(s t+1 ) on the right hand side, substituted iteratively for k(s t+n ) for n ≥ 1, and used the fact that there are no price bubbles, implying that lim n→∞ P s t+n |s t λ
The previous expression corresponds to the production plan that would be chosen by consumer-investors if they were making the inter-temporal investment decision. In particular, it implies that the value of the aggregate capital stock (or the price of the capital shares) is equal to the present value of its dividend payments . This illustrates several important facts. First, since the previous present value process corresponds to the present value process of any investor for which the portfolio restriction is not binding, the investment decision in this economy is made by the group of unconstrained investors. Second, since the present value process of any unconstrained investor satisfies the no arbitrage condition in (3), it follows that m ∈ Q s t (q 1 , d 1 ). Finally, since the absence of price bubbles implies that v d 1 (s t , λ) = q 1 (s t ) for all λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), the right hand side of the previous equation is unambiguously defined for any present value process in the consistent set, and all unconstrained investors will therefore agree on the previous value.
To see what happens when the investment decision is made by the firm, consider an analogous e-economy where households can trade in equity shares subject to fixed portfolio restrictions. In this case, households are subject to the following constraints:
where the pair of processes (q 1 , d 1 ) represent the equity price and dividend payments respectively. To analyze the effects of different firm objectives, we first assume first that the firm is maximizing its market value with respect to some consistent present value process λ ∈ Q s t (q 1 , d 1 ). Using the first order conditions of the firm and the same arguments as in the proof of lemma 3.1, both the value of equity and the value of the aggregate capital stock can be expressed as:
Thus, as shown earlier, a value maximizing firm will choose a level of investment k(s t ) that is equal to its ex-dividend market value q 1 (s t ). Further, since the previous present value is unambiguously defined for all processes in the consistent set Q s t (q 1 , d 1 ) due to the absence of price bubbles, the equation can be equivalently written as:
(24) where the process defined by m = (m s t+n t ) n≥1 is the marginal rate of substitution of any household that is unconstrained in the equity market.
The previous expression represents the production plan that would be chosen by the firm if it made the inter-temporal investment decision under a value maximizing objective, and it illustrates several important facts. First, a value maximizing firm will choose the same level of investment q 1 as the unconstrained consumer-shareholders, who all agree on this value. Note that this provides an alternative version of the unanimity result stated earlier. Second, the investment plan also satisfies the same condition as the optimal investment plan that consumers would choose in the k-economy. In sum, a value maximizing firm will choose the same investment level as if households were making the inter-temporal investment decision. Intuitively, a value maximizing plan equalizes the returns of equity and physical capital, leading to the same consumption opportunity sets in the two production economies. On the other hand, it is important to note that this equivalence only obtains under value maximization. To see this, consider the weighted value maximization and the utility maximization objectives postulated earlier. Recall that these are given by:
Using the first order conditions of the firm, it is easy to see that the aggregate capital stock satisfies the following equilibrium condition:
depending on the firm objective. Further, the first order conditions of the unconstrained households imply that the value of equity is given by the following expression in both cases:
Finally, to see that the previous equations imply that k(s t ) 6 = q 1 (s t ) at all nodes, note that, under utility maximization:
where c u i corresponds to the consumption of any unconstrained investor. In addition, the first order conditions of household i ∈ I under weighted value maximization imply that:
Given this, it becomes clear that consumer-investors and firms will choose different production plans in the absence of value maximization. Note that this has also important quantitative implications related to the existing macro-finance literature, where several authors have shown that imperfect risk sharing can lead to an increase in the aggregate capital stock with respect to its value under complete markets due to precautionary savings motives. In particular, using a k-economy setting, Aiyagari (1994) , Huggett (1997) and Smith (1997,1998) illustrate that the average level of the capital stock when markets are incomplete (k) lies strictly above its value under complete markets (k c ). Formally, q 1 = k > k c , implying that precautionary savings are directly reflected on the aggregate capital stock. On the other hand, Carceles-Poveda (2003 , 2004 analyzes the quantitative implications of the weighted value maximization and utility maximization objectives considered above in a two agent e-economy setting, showing that q 1 > k ≥ k c in this case. Thus, in the absence of value maximization precautionary savings effects are not necessarily reflected on the aggregate capital, and we can therefore conclude that capital ownership may matter when markets are incomplete, specially with respect to aggregate behavior.
External Finance
The present section extends the equivalence result obtained above to the presence of external finance 14 . Since our results are analogous to those of the previous section, we first discuss the different economies and then state the equivalence results without further discussion, relegating most of the proofs to the appendix. Before discussing the basic framework, however, several remarks are worth noting. First, the irrelevance of financial policy in the presence of market incompleteness has been established by several authors. In particular, Stiglitz (1969 Stiglitz ( , 1974 has extended the main irrelevance proposition of Miller (1958, 1963) to a multi-period general equilibrium setup with uncertainty. While he already pointed out that market completeness was not needed for the result, a more rigorous analysis was presented later by DeMarzo (1988) , who did not restrict the choices of the firm to debt-equity ratios, but allowed them to take arbitrary positions in the asset markets. Finally, while the previous authors abstract from the presence of effectively binding portfolio restrictions, Carceles-Poveda (2004) has shown that irrelevance of financial policy can still obtain in the presence of effectively binding state-dependent trading limits, which can be constructed to undo the financial actions of the firm. Given this, the analysis of the present section assumes that the portfolio restrictions are different from these. Second, it is important to note that our analysis will abstract from the determination of the optimal capital structure, an issue which is outside the scope of the present paper. Instead, we will follow most of the macrofinance literature by assuming that the financial plan of the firm is taken as given rather than something to be determined.
External Finance in the k-Economy.
To model the presence of external finance in the k-economy, we assume that the firm rises capital k(s t ) by issuing L f ⊆ L assets, where L f denotes the set of security indices that belong to the firm's capital structure. In particular, we let ρ l (s t ) denote the fraction of total capital accounted for by asset l ∈ L, i.e., q l (s t )A l (s t ) = ρ l (s t )k(s t ), where A l (s t ) is the supply of security l ∈ L f at the end of period t. Further, ρ l (s t ) = 0 if l / ∈ L f . Given this, the supply of securities can be defined as follows:
Note that, in the absence of external finance, ρ l (s t ) = 0 and ρ 1 (s t ) = 1 at all s t ∈ N, corresponding to the model of the previous sections.
is feasible for the entire information structure if ρ(s t ) is feasible at every node. Taking the financial plan as given, the firm in the k-economy maximizes the following objective:
is the total fraction of capital invested in equity, earning a gross return of R k (s t ), and ρ l (s t−1 )k(s t−1 ) is the fraction of capital invested in asset l ∈ L f , earning a gross return of
. The necessary and sufficient first order conditions from the previous optimization problem imply that:
A competitive equilibrium with respect to a feasible financial plan ρ can be defined as in section two, with the difference that the asset market clearing conditions are now given by:
Finally, note that we can again define the individual capital shares by a 1 i (s t ) = k i (s t )/(1− P l≥2 ρ l (s t ))k(s t ), implying that A 1 (s t ) = 1 and q 1 (s t ) = (1− P l≥2 ρ l (s t ))k(s t ) for all s t ∈ N . In addition, the dividends and one period payoff are given by d 1 (s t ) = R 1 (s t ) − q 1 (s t ) and R 1 (s t ) = R k (s t )(1 − P l≥2 ρ l (s t−1 ))k(s t−1 ), and this also implies that:
External Finance in the e-Economy. In the e-economy, the determination of the optimal investment plan is the same as before, and the relationship between the real and financial decisions can be expressed by the following accounting identity:
is the net cash flow if the firm, and A l (s t−1 ) and A l (s t ) denote the supply of security l ∈ L f at the beginning and the end of period t. In essence, the previous equation implies that the dividend payments by the firm to the holders of the assets that are part of its capital structure are equal to its net cash flow plus the net value from the securities issued during period t. In other words, the dividend payments of the firm are equal to the net cash flow plus the change in the ex-dividend firm value V + (s t ) − V − (s t ) during period t, where:
To define a financial plan in this economy, we let ρ l (s t ) be the fraction of the ex-dividend
is feasible if ρ(s t ) is feasible at every node. Note that, in the absence of external finance, ρ 1 (s t ) = 1, ρ l (s t ) = 0 for all l ≥ 2, V + (s t ) = V − (s t ) = q 1 (s t ), and P
, corresponding to the model in the previous sections.
A competitive equilibrium with respect to a financial plan ρ can be defined as in section two, with the difference that asset market clearing conditions are now given by:
Finally, using the accounting identity above, it follows that:
.3. Equivalence of the allocations under Value Maximization. The following results establish the equivalence of the set of equilibria in the k-and e-economies in the presence of external finance. As before, proposition 5.1 establishes the absence of price bubbles, lemma 5.1 shows that the aggregate capital stock in the e-economy is equal to the ex dividend firm value, and lemma 5.2 shows that the budget feasible allocations are the same in the two economies under the same financial plan ρ.
Proposition 5.1 Consider a competitive equilibrium for E k and E e with respect to a feasible financial plan ρ. For each node s t ∈ N and each security l ∈ L traded at s t ,
Lemma 5.1 If the firm in the e-economy with external finance discounts its net cash flows with a consistent present value process λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), the equilibrium production plan satisfies k(s t ) = V + (s t ) for all s t ∈ N . In particular, both variables are equal to the present value of the firm's net cash flows with respect to λ, i.e.,
Lemma 5.2 Consider optimal allocations in the k-and e-economies and assume that (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a , K a , k, q a and ρ are the same. If the firm in the e-economy discounts its net cash flows with a consistent present value price λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), the set of budget feasible allocations are the same in the two economies.
Using the previous results, the following two theorems establish the equivalence of the equilibrium allocations in the two production economies if they have the same financial plan. Further, theorem 5.3 establishes the irrelevance of the firm discount factor in the e-economy if the k-economy equilibrium is unique.
Then, there exist processes a 1 i and q 1 such that the vector
Theorem 5.3 If the equilibrium in the k-economy exists and it is unique, the e-economy equilibrium exists, and it is invariant with respect to the firm discount factor λ ∈ Q s t (q, d).
Finally, concerning shareholder aggrement, it can again be shown that a value maximizing plan satisfies
, where I L f ⊆ I is the subset of shareholders that are unconstrained in the assets that are part of the capital structure of the firm at very node. Notice that, even if every shareholder is unconstrained in the equity markets, value maximization can still lead to shareholder disagreement in the presence of external finance, opening the door to a more interesting analysis of unanimity in the present setup.
Conclusions
The present paper provides the conditions under which the irrelevance of physical capital ownership that prevails under complete markets still holds in a general incomplete markets environment with portfolio restrictions and possibly external financing of the investment plan. It is shown that, if the firm undertakes the inter-temporal investment decision by choosing a level of investment that maximizes its market value, the equilibrium allocations are the same as in the standard setup where households make the intertemporal investment decision and firms rent capital and labor to maximize profits on a period by period basis. The result requires that preferences exhibit a sufficient degree of impatience and that the production function is homogeneous of degree one in the two inputs. Since these two assumptions are relatively standard in the macro-finance literature, however, it can be applied to a relatively general setup. On the other hand, while the ownership of physical capital is irrelevant under value maximization, this objective still leads to shareholder disagreement within the firm in the presence of effectively binding portfolio restrictions, since only the unconstrained shareholders unanimously agree on the value maximizing production plan chosen by the firm, opening the possibility for a deeper analysis of unanimity in the present context. Finally, it is also shown that the quantitative implications of the absence of value maximization might differ from the standard static firm setup, particularly with respect to aggregate behavior. This is due to the fact that the equivalence between the aggregate capital stock and the value of the firm is broken in this case. On the other hand, since this seems to be more in line with the data, the absence of value maximization might be a promising avenue towards the explanation of several facts, such as the behaviour of capital versus stock returns.
APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 2.1. To simplify notation, let x t = x(s t ). By assumption, k t ≥ 0 and c t ≥ 0. To see that the set of feasible allocations is also bounded bounded above, consider the feasibility constraint for k t , implying that k t − k t−1 ≤ f (z t , k t−1 , 1) − δk t−1 . First, for each value of the aggregate shock z ∈ S z , there is a unique solution k t−1 satisfying f (z t , k t−1 , 1) − δk t−1 = 0. Further, since f is strictly increasing and concave in k, for each value of z ∈ S z , the maximum of f (z t , k t−1 , 1) − δk t−1 over k t−1 exists. We define
To see why the last inequality holds, let k t−1 > e k and k t−1 > k. By induction on t, this implies that k(s −1 ) > k, which is a contradiction.
Using the aggregate feasibility constraint, it follows that c t ≤ f (z t , k t−1 , 1)−δk t−1 +k t−1 +d ≤ b k +k +d.
Proof of proposition 3.1 (a) We first show that, if there exists a state prices process λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) such that v w (s t , λ) < +∞ for every date-state s t , then q l (s r ) = v d l (s r , λ) for all s r |s t with r ≥ t and each security traded at date-state s r that is either (i) of finite maturity or (ii) in positive net supply. To prove this, note that, if the preferences defined by % satisfy assumption (A.7) for each i ∈ I, there exists a 0 ≤ γ i < 1 such that for any date state s t ∈ N ,
for all for all γ ≥ γ i and all consumption plans satisfying c i (s r ) ≤ w c (s r ) at each s r ∈ N . Here, Â i denotes strict preference, c − i (s t ) denotes the consumption at all date-states other than the sub-tree nodes s r ∈ N such that s r |s t , and c + i (s t ) denotes the consumption at the nodes s r ∈ N with s r |s t and r > t. Given this property, if the plan (c i , a i ) is optimal at q, we have that, for all s t :
To see that equation (2) is true, let (1 − γ i )q 0 (s t )a i (s t ) > w c (s t ) for some s t . Household i could then choose the alternative plan (b c i , b a i ) :
which would be preferred to (c i , a i ) by equation (1), contradicting the fact that (c i , a i ) is optimal. Next, we show that, for all s t :
To see that this is the case, we multiply the date-state s t budget constraint of consumer i, satisfied with equality for each date-state given our assumptions on preferences, with some λ ∈ Q s t (q, d) for which v w (s t , λ) < +∞. Further, summing over all date-states s t+n , with dates 1 ≤ n ≤ T , we obtain:
Substituting equation (2), and taking the limit of the previous equation as T goes to infinity, we have that:
Since v w (s t , λ) < +∞ by assumption, it follows that v w i (s t , λ) < +∞ for all i, and the right hand side of the previous equation has a finite limit equal to λ(s t )v w i (s t , λ) < +∞. Since w(s t ) + d(s t )A = w c (s t ) and v dA (s t , λ) ≤ q 0 (s t )A < +∞, v w (s t , λ) < +∞ also implies that v w c (s t , λ) < +∞. In addition, the fact that c(s t ) ≤ w c (s t ) implies that v c (s t , λ) ≤ v w c (s t , λ) < +∞ so that v c i (s t , λ) < +∞ for all i ∈ I. Therefore, the first term on the left hand side of the previous equation also has a well defined and finite limit equal to λ(s t )v c i (s t , λ) < +∞. Finally, since v w c (s t , λ) < +∞ and w c (s t+T ) ≥ 0 for all date-states s t+T |s t , we have that lim T →∞ (1 − γ i ) −1 P s t+T |s t λ(s t+T )w c (s t+T ) = 0, which establishes the inequality in equation (3). Summing the inequality over households, we obtain:
Finally, substituting for c(s t ) = w(s t ) + d(s t )A, we have that:
On the other hand, the fact that
which contradicts equation (8). Therefore, it follows that v w (s t , λ) < +∞ for all λ ∈ Q s t (q, d).
Finally, to see that
for all λ ∈ Q s t (q, d), note that this directly follows from (a) in the k-economy. Further, to show that this is also the case in the e-economy, note that w(s t ) + d 1 (s t ) + k(s t ) = F (z(s t ), k(s t−1 ), 1), and we can therefore use the same arguments as above to establish that w(s t ) ≥ φ[F (z(s t ), k(s t−1 ), 1)] for some φ > 0. This clearly implies that the first infinite sum in equation (8) is finite for every λ ∈ Q s t (q, d). Therefore, for the sum in (8) to be finite, it must be the case that:
In what follows, the caret bearing variables denote k-economy allocations. To prove the lemma, note first that b c i (s t ) ∈ b B(s t ) if there exists a set of portfolio strategies ( b k i , (b a l i ) l≥2 ) i∈I such that, for all s t ∈ N and all i ∈ I :
where we have substituted for the equilibrium value of b
if there exists a set of portfolio strategies (a l i ) l≥1 such that, for all s t and all i ∈ I:
where we have used homogeneity of the production function and the fact that q 1 (s t ) = k(s t ) by lemma 3.1, implying that:
Let b c i (s t ) ∈ b B(s t ) and assume that the hypothesis of lemma 3.2 are satisfied. We now show that c i (s t ) = b c i (s t ) is feasible in the e-economy at each node s t ∈ N. To see this, consider any date-state
Further, if household i ∈ I chooses this portfolio, his wealth at the beginning of next period will be equal to:
where we have used the fact that
is also feasible in the e-economy at date-state s t+1 |s t . Finally, if the initial values are the same, i.e., if
, the period zero wealth of household i ∈ I in the e-economy is given by:
, households can implement the previous strategy at each node, and b c i (s t ) ∈ B i (s t ) at all s t ∈ N . Conversely, assume that c i (s t ) ∈ B i (s t ) and consider any date-state
, households in the k-economy can choose the portfolio b a l i (s t ) = a l i (s t ) for l ≥ 2 and b k i (s t ) = q 1 (s t )a 1 i (s t ), achieving the same consumption allocation as in the e-economy at date-state s t , since:
Further, since c w i (s t+1 ) = w i (s t+1 ), this will lead to the same wealth next period, i.e.,
Since b ω i (s t+1 ) = ω i (s t+1 ), we again have that c i (s t+1 ) = b c i (s t+1 ) is feasible in the k-economy at date state s t+1 |s t . Finally, since b ω i (s 0 ) = ω i (s 0 ), households can implement this strategy at every date-state s t ∈ N , and it follows that c i (s t ) ∈ b B i (s t ) at all nodes.¥ Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let ((c i , a i ) i∈I , (q, w), k) be a value maximizing competitive equilibrium for the economy specified by E e = (%, (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a , K a ). To show that (c i , b k i , (a l i ) l≥2 ) i∈I , (q a , w, b R k )) with b R k (s t ) = R 1 (s t )/q 1 (s t−1 ) and b k i (s t ) = q 1 (s t )a 1 i (s t ) for all s t ∈ N is a competitive equilibrium for E k = (%, (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a , K a ), note first that the aggregate capital in the Proof of lemma 5.1
Using the same arguments as in the proof of lemma 3.1, we can show that:
On the other hand, the ex-dividend firm value V + (s t ) = P it also follows that V + (s t ) = v N f (s t , λ)¥.
Proof of lemma 5.2
In what follows, the caret bearing variables denote k-economy allocations. To prove the lemma, we use the same arguments as in the proof of lemma 3.2. In particular, b c i (s t ) ∈ b B i (s t ) if there exists a set of portfolio strategies ( b k i , (b a l i ) l≥2 ) i∈I such that, for all s t :
where we have substituted for the equilibrium value of b R k (s t+1 can be rewritten as:
[f k (z(s t+1 ), k(s t ), 1)k(s t ) + (1 − δ)k(s t )− P l≥2 R l (s t+1 )ρ l (s t )k(s t )]q 1 (s t )a 1 i (s t ) (1 − P L l=2 ρ l (s t ))k(s t )
Further, this implies that:
Let the assumptions of lemma 5.2 be satisfied, and assume that b c i (s t ) ∈ b B i (s t ). To see that c i (s t ) = b c i (s t ) is feasible in the e-economy, consider any date-state s t ∈ N . If ω i (s t ) = b ω i (s t ), households can choose the portfolio a l i (s t ) = b a l i (s t ) and q 1 (s t )a 1 i (s t ) = b k i (s t ), implying that:
Further, at the beginning of next period, the wealth of household i ∈ I will be equal to:
Since ω i (s t+1 ) = b ω i (s t+1 ), c i (s t+1 ) = b c i (s t+1 ) is feasible in the e-economy at s t . Finally, if (a 0 ,k 0 , z 0 , 0 ) = (b a 0 , b k 0 , z 0 , 0 ), implying that k(s −1 )a 1 i (s −1 ) = b k i (s −1 ), we have that:
Thus, households can implement the strategy above at every date-state s t ∈ N , and b c i (s t ) ∈ B i (s t ) at all nodes. Conversely, assume that c i (s t ) ∈ B i (s t ). If b ω i (s t ) = ω i (s t ), households in the keconomy can choose the portfolio b a l i (s t ) = a l i (s t ) for l ≥ 2 and b k i (s t ) = q 1 (s t )a 1 i (s t ) and achieve the same consumption allocation as in the e-economy at date state s t , since: Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let ((c i , a i ) i∈I , (q, w), k, ρ) be a value maximizing equilibrium for the economy specified by E e = (%, (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a , K a ). We now show that (c i , b k i , (a l i ) l≥2 ) i∈I , (q a , w, b R k ), ρ), with b k i (s t ) = q 1 (s t )a 1 i (s t ) and b R k (s t ) = R 1 (s t )/q 1 (s t−1 ) for all s t ∈ N is a competitive equilibrium for E k = (%, (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a , K a ). To prove this, note first that the aggregate capital in the k-economy is given by
where and we have used the fact that a 1 i generates market clearing in the e-economy. Given this, the two factor prices:
w(s t ) = f l (z(s t ), k(s t−1 ), 1) = f l (z(s t ), b k(s t−1 ), 1) b R k (s t ) = R 1 (s t )A 1 (s t−1 ) q 1 (s t−1 )A 1 (s t−1 ) = (f k (z(s t ), k(s t−1 ), 1) + (1 − δ)− P l≥2 R l (s t )ρ l (s t−1 ))k(s t−1 )
(1 − P l≥2 ρ l (s t−1 ))k(s t−1 )
satisfy the firm's optimality conditions in the k-economy. Second, since (k 0 , a 0 , z 0 , 0 ), (π z , π ), d a , K a , q a , k and ρ are the same in the two economies, lemma 5.2 implies that b B i (s t ) = B i (s t ) for all i ∈ I and all s t ∈ N . Therefore, since c i is optimal for each i ∈ I in the e-economy, it is also optimal for each i ∈ I in the k-economy. Note also that the portfolio strategies achieving this allocation b a l i (s t ) = a l i (s t ) for l ≥ 2 and b k i (s t ) = q 1 (s t )a 1 (s t ) are optimal, while they clearly satisfy the portfolio constraints, since:
